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Infroductory Remarks by Robert V. Roosa
I know that John Lintner's paper is going to occupy many of you
long after these meetings are concluded. You will find that it is more
than a remarkable survey of the staggering contribution in space, time,
and pagination that the Bureau has contributed to the field of financial
research over its lifetime. Not only has he read, digested, criticized, and
summarized this vast volume of Bureau contributions, but he has gone
on to make suggestions, to point out to the rest of us where he thinks
additional Bureau research can go and the changes in dimension and
focus that might now be possible on the basis of this massive body of
accumulated information and analysis that the Bureau has already
provided.
I think I should indicate at the beginning that not only has John
Lintner provided splendid coverage of Bureau documentation in the
broad area of financial research, he has introduced into his paper the
great breadth of knowledge he has in the field as a whole. There are
even one or two footnote references to his own contributions which I
have always found scintillating and perceptive, and I know you will today
in digesting this ambitious paper.
* * *
WilliamJ. Baumol: It is a profound privilege to have the opportunity to
pay tribute to the National Bureau of Economic Research on the occa-
sion of its fiftieth anniversary and to acknowledge the profession's great
debt to it for its contributions to our learning, most notably for leading
us to face the quantitative facts, even when we might have been reluctant
to do so.
Lintner has performed a substantial task, having undertaken to
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overthe years been produced under the sponsorship of the Bureau. He
has, with his usual thoroughness and insight, produced not only an
overview but also a helpful evaluation and a discussion of programs for
further research. The validity and comprehensiveness of his discussion
suffer from only one disadvantage: They make it very difficult for a
discussant who can find little to expand upon and nothing with which
to disagree.
I believe Lintner is right in his evaluation of the National Bureau's
work in the financial area and right also in the directions to which he
points for further research. Though he calls for the use of a theoretical
and analytical base, he is careful to avoid the tired discussion of "facts
without theory." What makes his observations on this score timely is
not primarily a matter of the Bureau's own orientation, but a change in
the nature of the theoretical material that is available for use as a frame-
work for empirical research.
For our discipline, the sixties was a decade which brought forth a
number of important new ideas. Few of them, however, were contribu-
tions to pure theory. Rather, a preponderance of the major innovations
were composed of applications of the theory to a number of fields which
were formerly the exclusive province of those who provide descriptive
and historical materials. For example, the field of public utility regula-
tion, previously devoted heavily to the discussion of legal institutions
and the course of their development, has suddenly been inundated by a
variety of theoretical writings making heavy use of relatively, sophisti-
cated mathematical tools such as Kuhn-Tucker theory. Public finance is
another applied field in which the role of formal theory has expanded
significantly. In short, it would not be seriously misleading to character-
ize the ten years that have just passed as the decade of applied theory.
Probably no single field has felt the impact of this development
more strongly than that of finance. The rash of literature on the term
structure of interest rates does base itself on earlier work by Lutz and
I-licks. But recent contributions by writers such as Meiselman and
Malkiel have provided a basis and a wealth of hypothesis for systematic
empirical research. Modigliani and Miller as well as Professor Lintner
have given us a body of materials on the role of dividends and the
valuation of stocks which has led to a protracted discussion of funda-
mental elements in the analysis of financial instruments, and has pro-
duced contentions that can only be settled empirically. The portfolio
selection analysis contributed by Markowitz and Tobin is still another
illustration of this sort of development.56 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
All of this is to say that several decades ago, a call in the field of
finance for the empiricists to base their work more heavily on theoretical
analysis would not have been easy to heed. Today there seems to be no
end to the work of this variety that still needs to be done. Now, therefore,
such an admonition is much less an empty gesture because the program
of work is there and hardly needs to be laid out.
However, if this is the direction we are now to propose for the work
of the Bureau, it would seem that we come a little late. The fact is that
many of the outstanding economists associated with the Bureau have
already gone off in this direction, and are well along on the way. If one
thumbs through the 50th A nnual Report of the National Bureau, one
finds described in it a profusion of econometric studies based upon theo-
retical models, these in a variety of fields. The section devoted to finance
is no exception. For example, one finds reported there Cagan's study
of the monetary effects of interest rates, Kessel's study of the cyclical
behavior of interest rates, Sargent's "Expectations at the Short End
of the Yield Curve" and his study of the Gibson paradox,1 all of them
topics clearly having substantial theoretical implications. The fact is that
the Bureau's work has already been turned toward theory both as a
source for topics for research, and as an area to which its own work can
contribute.
This is not meant to imply that the Bureau has abandoned the por-
tions of its work which are devoted to descriptive studies and to data
gathering. However, no one would wish for any slackening in the pace
of these undertakings. This sort of effort has always produced valuable
contributions, and one would hope that it will continue alongside the
activities that are more analytical in their orientation.
Let me, in closing, mention one problem in the field of finance not
emphasized by Lintner to which one might well ask for the devotion of
further research effort. Despite the profusion of developments in the field,
both empirical and analytical, the results have so far been fairly disap-
pointing to those who are concerned with application, at least at the
micro level. The reason is that so many of the conclusions that have been
derived are essentially negative in character. The random walk literature
1 Phillip Cagan, The Channels of Monetary Effects on Interest Rates, forth-
coming; Reuben A. Kessel, The Cyclical Behavior o/the Structure of Interest
Rates, Occasional Paper 91, 1965; Thomas J. Sargent, "Expectations at the Short
End of the Yield Curve: An Application of Macauley's Test," in Jack M. Gutten-
tag, ed., Essays on interest Rates, Vol. II, 1971; and Sargent, "A Study of the Gibson
Paradox," 50th Annual Report of the National Bureau of Economic Research,
September 1970.Finance and Capital Markets 57
provides the outstanding illustration, for its implication is that, in the
absence of inside information, the attempt to analyze securities and fore-
cast their value may well be a waste of time. Similar in spirit in this
respect is Little and Raynor's work indicating that past performance
of a company in terms of the rate of growth of its earnings is virtually
useless as a predictor of its prospective performance. A group working
at Princeton, including Burton G. Malkiel, Richard Quandt, and Peggy
Heim has found virtually no relationship between the resources a firm
plows back into its capital stock and the rate of growth of its earnings.2
All of this has been extremely disquieting to those who have looked
to the economists' writings on finance for guidance for their own activi-
ties. A bit of debunking is no doubt a good thing, but where does one
go from there? All of this is to say that any results which are less negative
in character will find a most receptive audience. The field, moreover,
does not lack hypotheses, albeit most of them naive. Perhaps the random
walk results and the other pieces of evidence mean that there exist in this
area no positive results in search of a discoverer, but I think this has not
yet been demonstrated. Perhaps someone among those whose work is
sponsored by the National Bureau can help to show the way. Certainly,
many interesting and challenging issues for research are to be found here.
Sidney Homer:There is only one real answer to the question "What
should the National Bureau be doing in the future?" and that is, "Every-
thing." I am sure that John Meyer would add, "If all our subscribers
multiply their subscriptions by ten or twenty, we will." I have a little list
here today, though, of a few things which would be especially useful
from my selfish point of view, some of which are certainly already being
worked on. I have in mind more listing of factual data, so that the reader
can apply his own theories and perhaps disagree with the author.
Over the years perfectly magnificent work has been done by Ray-
mond Goldsmith and othersinflow-of-fundstatistics,through the
capital market, into and out of various forms of institutions, and all
integrated together. At the bottom of the supply list, there is a residual
called "miscellaneous and private investors," which in our analyses of
2 This work almost suggests that companies might as well not plough back
any of their funds for all the difference, overall, that it makes to their earnings!
The rate of return on new debt seems to be somewhat higher, while the return on
new equity turns out, generally, to be significantly more substantial. For the results
of this study see William J. Baumol et al., "Earnings Retention, New Capital and
the Growth of the Firm," Review of Economics and Statistics, November 1970,
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credit flows we could have pretty well ignored in most of the postwar
years. We are now in a period, as you all know, in which "miscellaneous
and unaccounted for" are accounting for something like 60 per cent of
the capital flows in the bond market. I have over the last few years been
needling anyone who is available to be needled—the FED, the SEC, and
the National Bureau—to look into this massive supply-of-credit field,
which last year bought over $25billionof bonds net, and to break it
down into component parts that have some meaning, so that the flows
can be traced insofar as possible from savings institutions, stocks, and
so on into bonds; so that we may know something about this group—
as much as we know about savings banks, for example, and life insurance
companies.
Second would be further analysis of the government sector. Not
enough has been done on the role of government in our capital markets.
The proportion attributed to government in the GNP analysis I suspect
strongly underestimates the role of government in our economy. More
and more in our capital markets, the device of guaranteeing private obli-
gations is becoming massive, and with tremendous implications for the
future. I would suggest this be studied on a broader base than the GNP
base,particularlyas regardsitseffects on the capital market,its
effects on the economy, and its effects on the distribution of resources.
Next, I would suggest a very lively topic which will not come as a
surprise to most of you: the topic of the role of social priorities in the
capital markets, the question of how resources are directed by pure
open-market rationing as distinguished from national objectives and
national priorities. It seems to me that this is not new but of greatly
expanding importance, and I haven't seen it really covered in a com-
plete way.
We have another topic that has become very lively this year, the
question of liquidity: the quality of institutional portfolios, the liquidity
of institutions, and the liquidity of industrial firms. We know this is not
purely a statistical matter; so far as I know there is no set of ratios that
answers the question, because liquidity is at least 50 per cent psycho-
logical.
But the whole liquidity question and the credit question and the
credit quality question are vital. I do not know how the econometricians
work it into their models. One week the lending policies of American
institutions are among the most liberal in years; a week later, they are
among the most conservative in years. Something has happened—I'mFinance and Capital Markets 59
referringnow to the Penn Central, but this is only a symbol—there are
plenty of other situations that have worried lending officers.If their
credit policies change, money flows change, and there is a vital effect on
the economy. No doubt in a broad sense this has been studied, but I
would think that in a specific and practical sense it would be a big field
for research work now.
That is far from the end of my list, but those are the high spots. I
will stop here and make two general observations. A great many im-
portant statistical studies have been done, by the National Bureau and
by others, that are extremely useful. It is regrettable that in many cases
when they come out the latest statistics in them are four years old. I
know this is a mechanical problem that is extremely difficult to solve, but
the pertinence of the document is greatly impaired. Along the same lines,
and again from my practical standpoint, I would like to see a great deal
of the statistical work brought up to date. I know it is the policy of the
Bureau to do the basic work in the hope that some government agency
will keep it up to date. In the case of flow of funds this has been done,
but there are other instances where this has not been done. I would
personally find very useful some periodic publication that brings past
statistical studies up to date, at least that type of study that can be
brought up to date in a ready manner, so that the study becomes fresh
all of a sudden, and useful.
James O'Leary: When I read John Lintner's paper I had the same
feeling that Bill Baumol had. Lintner has done a monumental job. The
books he has reviewed would occupy twenty feet of shelving in
any library. In effect, what he has done is a one-man exploratory com-
mittee job on what's going on in the financial research field and what
needs to be done. I think the Bureau, which in the past has had explora-
tory committees, owes a big debt of gratitude to John Lintner for the
job he has done.
As I read through that paper, I was a little taken aback because I
hadn't realized quite what the nature of the paper would be. I expected
this to be a paper oriented toward monetary issues. As I got into it, I
kept meeting old friends all along the way, and it was a very heartwarm-
ing experience for me. I had the great fortune right after World War II
when teaching at Duke to be offered the job of director of investment
research for the Life Insurance Association of America. One part of my
job was to help the life insurance business decide on financial research
that it felt it could support.60 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
In the period from 1947 through 1967, while I was involved in
this, we advanced something like two million dollars in research funds to
the National Bureau. I suppose today, in terms of what that will buy in
research, it would be equivalent to maybe four or five million dollars in
research funds. We got involved in this actually before I was on the
scene in the very early projects that are described in John's paper where
the original exploratory committee of the Bureau in 1937 came up with
some projects. We were participants, for example, in the corporate bond
project that Brad Hickman carried out. As you look through this list we
did the financing of Ray Goldsmith's study of savings. It was one of the
most exciting two years of my life to be closely associated with this, not
actually in a research role but very closely associated with it. And that
wasn't done, incidentally, as a National Bureau project. It was done
under R. W. Goldsmith Associates, before Goldsmith became associated
with the Bureau. The interesting thing there was that we clothed him with
an advisory committee so that he'd be completely independent. That
advisory committee had some notable names on it. It had, among the
economists, Win Riefler as chairman. It also had on it Jack Viner of
Princeton, Sumner Slichter of Harvard, Arthur F. Burns, Simon Kuznets,
and Ted Yntema. In addition we financed another project called the
Study of the Postwar Capital Markets, exploring the changes in the
capital market. There were a number of participants in this. This is the
project in which Saul Kiaman did his great job on the residential mort-
gage market; and Roland Robinson, a great job on state and local
government financing. Then we financed Kuznets's study of capital
requirements. Incidentally, in many of these cases, the idea of the
projects actually originated with the life insurance people. Wefinanced
a study of interest rates which the Bureau has done. Phil Cagan had a
very important part in that. As I mentioned, we financed Hickman's
corporate bond project and many others. We put money into the pension
fund study conducted by Roger Murray. So I take a great deal of pride
when I hear John talk about what has come out of this research; I agree
with him. I think it has been a very, very important contribution, and a
great deal is owed some of the men who helped obtain the financing of
these projects—in particular, John Sinclair, who later headed the Na-
tional Industrial Conference Board; F. W. Ecker, who later became
the chief executive of Metropolitan Life; Don Slichter, president of
Northwestern Mutual; George Conklin, president of the Guardian Life
Company; and Robert B. Patrick, senior vice president of Bankers Life
of Iowa.Finance and Capital Markets 61
I think we have to do more to get the commercial banks and other
financial institutions interested in this sort of approach. As I see it, the
amount of money that has to go into financial research, if itis to be
effective with the Bureau and other places, is a large multiple of what's
been done in the past.
Now let me just wind up by saying, I couldn't agree more with
John Lintner's suggestions as to the direction that research should take.
I think it is true that no revolutionary change is needed. The kind of
research that the Bureau has proved itself so well in is what it should
continue to do. I agree there should be some change in strategy in the
direction of more analytical work rather than purely a collection of
figures. But it will be awfully hard for the Bureau to do this because the
financial system is changing so quickly that simply the gathering of data
is going to continue to be a major part of this whole picture. I think the
sort of issues and problems John has raised are right, and all I would like
to do is to add one or two that occur to me. There is one big one, and
then there are others that are more obvious. The big one is this: Since the
latter part of 1965 there has been an escalation of inflation, and along
with it there has been the sharp rise in interest rates, with interest rates
now at record high levels. The likelihood is that interest rates, even
though they will fluctuate cyclically, are going to continue to remain at
high levels. What I would like to see the Bureau do is to study the
question of how our financial system is affected by this sort of condition;
how it is affected by Federal Reserve policies now as compared with a
condition in which we had a lower level of interest rates and more in the
way of price stability.I think that there are profound effects on the
financial institutions if you analyze them in these terms. For example,
how is this sort of condition affecting the cash flow of the financial
institutions? How is it affecting their willingness and their ability to make
forward investment commitments to buy bonds and mortgages? How is
it affecting their preference for equities or equity kickers? How does
monetary policy work differently today under these sets of conditions
than would have been the case, say, even three or four years ago, or
certainly ten years ago? If we should go through another cycle such as
the one we had in 1966, or in 1969—70, I wonder whether some of our
financial institutions could survive. I think that some are more threatened
than others. Can our financial system as we have known it in the past
continue to function successfully with a 4 per cent rate of inflation, which
is what many people are assuming?62 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
To take a few other areas, perhaps the Bureau could do more in
the way of putting some meat and bones on the whole question of how
expectation of inflation affects investment decisions. This is a tremen-
dously important development. I don't see quite how the Bureau can get
at it in a quantitative way, but, I think, through close contact with
decision-makers in the financial markets, perhaps an awful lot can be
done to help get a better understanding of the effects of the expectation
of inflation on the bond and stock markets. Our financial system is
changing rapidly. As you look at the catalogue of what the Bureau has
done, you can see how far out of date it is in terms of what's going on
today. For example, there is very little that the Bureau has done in the
area of at least updating information on mortgage loans on income-type
property. Very little in the way of data has been collected on the whole
use of equity kickers on loans. I would say, finally, I think there is a
great opportunity now to make another advance in the flow-of-funds
area to get gross figures. The flow-of-funds data are still just net changes
in outstandings, whereas, for example, in the life insurance business,
there is now a rich body of data on the gross cash flow for investment.
I think this sort of data probably is available in some of the other finan-
cial institutions as well.
* * *
ClosingRemarks by Roosa
It does seem to me that we have assembled a list here which is
largely action oriented in terms of the implications of the array of
suggestions for future research.I think thisisin keeping with the
approach that John Lintner has taken in his paper, indicating that
broadly speaking so much has been done in describing the what of the
financial system that we need now more on the interrelations and the
why. All the same, I think we must agree with Jim O'Leary and Sidney
Homer that much of the work that has already been done by the Bureau
that stands as classic is still in need of updating—of continuous testing
against new data. There does have to be a compromise between these
two kinds of objectives, and I am sure will always continue to be. I'd
like to sum up what I think are several of the action-oriented suggestions
that have been made thus far, and then add a couple.
It does seem to me that John has indicated the need for getting
inside the boxes of the whole flow-of-funds analysis, for updating and
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terms of the data, vast as that is, but in terms of the causation. In
addition, we have had some variants on that fundamental approach in
Bill Baumol's recognition that the Bureau in its effort to move in new
directions has had, as I think he put it, an increasing infusion of mathe-
matical inspiration. I may not have accurately paraphrased him, but the
implications there, in terms of the techniques of data manipulation and
in developing the power of theoretical analysis, are clear enough. But he
took this in another direction as well. He was a little mystified, if I am
not unduly generalizing from his more precise statement, as to how the
capital allocation mechanism really works and how it can be considered
rational as it relates to the application of retained earnings in the total
process of capital formation in the economy. He can't also quite under-
stand how the returns that he finds on new equity and on the commit-
ment of new investment funds in the established large and growing
corporations explain the claim in relative terms that they are exerting on
the total of our supply of available savings—the contribution to the
capital stock that they do in fact carry through. I may be sharpening too
invidiously what he said much more delicately, and I may have misun-
derstood. But I would suggest that this is one set of that
probably does deserve additional thought and consideration.
Before we get too far with those, we have to come to one of the
several suggestions that Sidney Homer made, because we are entering
what probably is another mutation phase in the array of criteria that
society is going to accept or impose on itself. Implications of this for the
processes of capital allocation have yet to be determined. The point
Sidney made was that we haven't yet figured it out, although some of us
find that we are harassed or buffeted or moved or pressed every day or
so by the criticism we are receiving that socialprioritiesare not
adequately represented in the processes of capital allocation. We have
to find a clearer way of expressing what they are and how they can be
quantified, how they can be represented in the investment process. I think
to be more specific, Sidney also reminded us that the miscellaneous
categories in some of our financial data have now become so large that
we lack an explanation of the principal sources of investment in fixed-
interest obligations which we can't penetrate further. Of course, we aren't
going to get the answer satisfactorily there.
In addition, if we are going to find not only the who but the why, we
must go on into some of the other questions that he and Jim O'Leary
raised. The question, of course, that is going to have a pervasive signifi-
cance, as long as any of us remember those two words Penn Central, is the64 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
significance of liquidity not merely for the financial institutions but for the
industrial firm. What does it mean and how are we usefully going to estab-
lish standards, both of evaluation and performance, that will fit with the
criteria we want to have for rational capital allocation in the system?
All of this can become almost revolutionarily terrifying if we let ourselves
think too far. The implications in pure research are, I think, themselves
sufficiently challenging. As Jim O'Leary brought us closer to the present
day in another respect, he stressed that none of us really have satisfac-
torily thought through yet, as far as I know, even the purely abstract
systematic implications of our kind of economy, operating in an envi-
ronment in which it must be assumed that there will be a continuing
pattern of inflation—I think he said at the 4 per cent level. We haven't
really thought through what that kind of outside given element will do
to so much of the pattern of interrelations that we would otherwise be
measuring from past performance. Just within the past two years we've
had a mutation or followed a path that won't be completely reversible,
even if we do get lower rates of inflation in the future.
The significance of having had this bath of inflation—whether or
not it continues—is certainly an area we want to be certain is explored
and reflected in the many more detailed and specific projects that the
Bureau will be carrying forward. As he said in concluding, and this is
implied in many of the other things I've also mentioned, there is the
more specific translation of this inflation mentality into expectations as
they affect investment decisions, that is, the investment decisions of the
firm as well as the commitment of the lender or the source of funds.
In all this we may have passed through a period that is so rich in
new experience that we can well justify spending a major part of any
research effort such as that of the Bureau in trying not to look at the
longer time series that will, perhaps, over the decades ahead provide the
more lasting evidences of the inner patterns of the economy. We may
find that we are going to need and want to devote more attention to the
study of the special phenomena that came with this, let's hope, short-
lived experience of rapid inflation in this kind of economy. It is quite
understandable and, I think, all of us have shared a bit of it, that during
an inflation of this kind there should have been a revival of that search
for the Holy Grail or the simple formula that always characterizes man-
kind in the face of crisis or new challenge. This time, we called back to
Chicago and came out with the revival of the monetarist approach,
which is probably likely to shift back into a position of more balanced
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receivingwidespread attention a year or so ago. Nonetheless, I think,
what we are going to want to do is to study it in every way we can. This
will involve the selective study of cases, as well as the analysis of data,
and the extent to which, in this recent period when inflation has been
the dominant characteristic of our economic performance, the monetary
phenomenon as such has attained a special new significance and a new
force, a force certainly greater than would have been attributed to it,
as John Lintner points out in his paper, in any of the earlier model build-
ing. In this respect, he does go back as early as the first Klein models
twenty years ago, indicating (in keeping with our Keynesian biases of
those days) that very little recognition was then given to money as an
independent influence.
Reaching outside this need for bringing up to date in the present
context what deserves to survive of the monetarist view, there is another
area of financial analysis which no one has mentioned today. It is a part
of the Bureau's effort nonetheless, and since I am generally considered
to be rather fanatic on this subject, I wouldn't dare turn the meeting over
to you without mentioning it: We have had new developments in the
balance-of-payments relations of this country and in the rest of the
world as well.
Another new phenomenon to which the Bureau has already given
some attention (as have members of the Bureau staff on their own) is
the phenomenon of the Eurodollar market, both short and long. The
relations between the supply of and demand for funds in that market
inject another dimension of altogether different scale in magnitude and
in implications for the conduct of our financial markets, an altogether
different dimension from anything that existed during the period when
most of the data to which John refers in his paper were being put
together. I think we have here another important area, and not merely
for debunking the significance of what I suppose this year will be an
official settlements deficit of eight or nine billion dollars that will
occur largely because a completely extraterritorial volume of forty billion
odd dollars can move back and forth between private holders abroad
and central banks abroad, and such movement happens to be defined as
a deficit in the U.S. balance of payments. These are new phenomena, but
these patterns of movement have their ricochets, with implications
reaching back into the money market, and to some extent into the bond
market, sometimes as a safety valve and sometimes as a source of new
fear and concern, which I'm sure somewhere in this scale of projects
deserves some mention.66 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
I will close with one more comment. I have been a little struck,
and I am not sure whether this is too naive to mention, but I'm a little
struck with the alacrity with which the present Administration has
adopted an approach that some of us like to be identified with from an
earlier Administration; that is, the concept of the economy's potential as
a guide both to fiscal policy and to the potential risks of inflation. My
own thought, when we were giving a lot of attention in 1960—62 to this
same concept (beginning from a low level of employment), was that if
this potential were to be usable as the base on which to fill out additional
spending—either through a government deficit or an easier monetary
policy—it required a little more than just simply projecting a 4 per cent
line across a piece of graph paper. There was also going to have to be an
underlying capital base—a capital base which would be expanding,
improving, or enlarging, or raising the productive quotient of the total
mix of men and labor in the economy. Conversely, if we were to assume
stagnation in the capital formation process, we wouldn't be able to
draw that handsome line across the graph paper. What I suggest is, at
least as I saw it in those days, we couldn't really draw that line unless we
had also assured ourselves of a fairly sustained pattern of capital
formation in the direction of intensifying the capital structure.
That's why, at least in my view, we began so aggressively and
succeeded only after two years in introducing the investment credit as a
part of this procedure. Whether or not you like that technique, it is a
good one to study—for its effects as well. Every time people in my firm
or other's write a story about any firm they are considering investing in
these days, three or four lines have to be inserted about how, without
the investment credit, this had happened or that had happened. People
were inclined to say, and people in high places said a year or so ago, that
the investment credit was a mere fiction, but the analysis of the individual
cases now is certainly showing that, at least in those that I see, and there
are quite a few, the elimination of the investment credit is doing some-
thing to impair the capital market. It is possible that here in the Bureau's
action-oriented part of the program there may be something worth
exploring; that is, whether we can safely assume that this projection of
the full employment potential for the economy can exist regardless of
what is going on or permitted or encouraged insofar as capital formation
is concerned.